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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Carolina Convenience Stores, Inc., Harry Lancaster, Jr. 

as 

Power of Attorney for Harry Lancaster, Sr. and Willard 

Oil Company, Inc., Petitioners, 

v. 
City of Spartanburg, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-212473 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Spartanburg County 

E. C. Burnett, III, Special Circuit Court Judge,  

Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27663 

Heard June 25, 2014 – Filed August 31, 2016 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 
Charles J. Hodge and Timothy Ryan Langley, both of 
Hodge & Langley Law Firm, P.C., of Spartanburg, for 
Petitioners. 
David Leon Morrison, of Morrison Law Firm, L.L.C., of 
Columbia, for Respondent. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES: Carolina Convenience Stores, Inc., Harry 
Lancaster, Jr., and Willard Oil Company, Inc., (collectively, Petitioners) brought 
claims for inverse condemnation and negligence against the City of Spartanburg 
(the City) for damages to Petitioners' convenience store caused by the City's police 
department during its handling of a hostage situation.  The circuit court granted the 
City's summary judgment motion as to the inverse condemnation claim, but denied 
it as to the negligence claim.  The jury returned a verdict in the City's favor as to 
Petitioners' negligence claim.  Petitioners appealed only the inverse condemnation 
ruling. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the circuit court properly granted 
summary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claim. Carolina Convenience 
Stores, Inc. v. City of Spartanburg, 398 S.C. 27, 727 S.E.2d 28 (Ct. App. 2012).  
We granted Petitioners' request for a writ of certiorari and now affirm the court of 
appeals' decision as modified. 
FACTS
Jimmy Johnson fled from police after being stopped for having an expired vehicle 
license. Johnson, who was armed, entered Carolina Convenience Store in 
Spartanburg, where he took Saroj Patel hostage.  The City's police department 
negotiated with Johnson in an effort to encourage Johnson to surrender.  After the 
negotiations were unsuccessful, the police department cut off the power to the 
convenience store and introduced tear gas and pepper spray into the building's 
ventilation system in another vain attempt to induce surrender.
During these attempts to secure Johnson's surrender, the City's police department 
was unable to determine, visually or otherwise, Patel and Johnson's location within 
the convenience store. After a twelve hour standoff, the police decided to breach 
the building with a bulldozer, which resulted in severe physical damage to the 
property. Given the substantial damage to the store, Petitioners were later asked by 
the City to tear it down as it did not comply with ordinances regarding vacant 
commercial buildings in its damaged state.  After Petitioners refused, the City 
demolished the building.  
13
	
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                        
Petitioners' inverse condemnation action was based on the police department's
actions during the hostage situation, not the City's later decision to demolish the 
building. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 Lanham v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002).
DISCUSSION 
The South Carolina Constitution provides that, “private property shall not be taken 
. . . for public use without just compensation being first made for the property.”  
Art. I, § 13(A).  Inverse condemnation occurs when a government agency takes 
private property without formally exercising its power of eminent domain.  
Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't. of Transp., 391 S.C. 429, 706 S.E.2d 501 
(2011). Inverse condemnation may result either from the government's physical 
appropriation of private property or from government-imposed limitations on the 
use of private property. Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656, 620 S.E.2d 
76, 79 (2005). 
To prevail on an inverse condemnation claim, one must prove: (1) an affirmative 
act by a government entity; (2) that amounts to a taking; and (3) the taking is for 
public use.  Carolina Chloride, 391 S.C. at 435, 706 S.E.2d at 504.  The burden of 
proof is on an owner of private property to establish that a government entity has 
taken his property. Hilton Head Auto., L.L.C. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 394 S.C. 
27, 30, 714 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2011). 
In affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals 
found the City's actions did not amount to a compensable taking because the 
property had not been physically appropriated for public use, and because no 
physical appropriation occurred even though there was damage to the property.  
Carolina Convenience, 398 S.C. at 30–31, 727 S.E.2d at 31–33.  The court of 
appeals further held there was no compensable taking because the City's actions 
were a valid exercise of the police power.  Id.
1 The parties concede there is no question of fact. 
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Petitioners contend the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) not applying the balancing 
test found in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978); (2) holding the City's actions were a valid exercise of its "police power";2 
and (3) failing to hold Petitioners' constitutional rights to property trump the City's
exercise of its police power even if the City's actions were a valid exercise of such 
power. While Petitioners raise multiple arguments, the narrow issue in this case is 
whether the City's actions constituted a compensable taking as contemplated by 
S.C. Const. art. I, § 13(A). As explained below, we hold that they did not. 
Whether there has been a taking by inverse condemnation within the meaning of 
the South Carolina Constitution is a question for the court.  E.g., Carolina 
Chloride, Inc. v. Richland County, 391 S.C. 154, 714 S.E.2d 869 (2011).  We 
reject Petitioners' contention that the actions of the City's police department 
constituted a taking, and join the majority of jurisdictions3 in holding that the South 
2 When we have made a distinction between "police power" and eminent domain, 
we have referred to "police power" as the State's power to enact laws and 
regulations that affect a person's use of his property (as in zoning), and not the 
power to enforce laws through law enforcement actions.  See, e.g., Edens v. City of 
Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956) (holding that eminent domain and 
police power are not the same and just compensation must be made only in the 
government's exercise of eminent domain); cf. Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining "police power" as "the inherent and plenary power of a 
sovereign to make all law necessary and properly to preserve public security, 
order, health, morality, and justice").  Stated differently, the power being exercised 
here was the power to enforce law, rather than the power to enact law. 
3 Whether a compensable taking has occurred in this context is a novel question in 
South Carolina. Other jurisdictions are split on the answer.  Compare Brutsche v. 
City of Kent, 193 P.3d 110, 121 (Wash. 2008) (espousing the majority rule and 
holding the use of a battering ram to gain entry to execute a search warrant did not 
constitute a taking); Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London 
Subscribing to Certificate No. TPCLDP217477 v. City of St. Petersburg, 864 So.2d 
1145, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the majority rule and finding 
damage to apartment caused by police use of “flash-bang” grenades in executing a 
search warrant did not constitute a taking under just compensation clause and any 
15
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
   
Carolina Constitution does not contemplate that damage occasioned to private 
property by law enforcement in the course of performing their duties constitutes a 
compensable taking.4  In interpreting S.C. Const. art. I, § 13(A), we are persuaded
that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that law enforcement operate 
under the fear that their actions could lead to takings-based liability. 
We find the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of Petitioners' takings claim, 
which relied on its conclusion that there was no taking because the city did not 
physically appropriate the property for public use.  Instead, we simply hold the 
damage to Petitioners' property during the police department's hostage rescue effort 
did not constitute a taking as contemplated by the South Carolina Constitution.  In 
addition, we find the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the police 
department's actions as a "legitimate exercise of its police power."  As we have 
explained above, the term "police power" as it relates to eminent domain actions 
refers to the government's authority to limit the use of private property through its 
regulatory authority, and thus has no relevance to the resolution of this matter.   
Finally, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 
S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) and Edens v. City of Columbia, supra for the 
proposition that "[a] detriment to private property . . . result[ing] from a legitimate 
exercise of police power does not constitute a taking of private property for public 
use." Carolina Convenience, 398 S.C. at 32, 727 S.E.2d at 30.  In our view, such a 
broad holding runs counter to our modern jurisprudence, which recognizes that an 
action for inverse condemnation may lie even when a governmental entity takes 
property pursuant to a "legitimate exercise of its police power."  Cf. Byrd, 365 S.C. 
at 658–62, 620 S.E.2d at 80–82.  
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' decision as modified and hold that 
property damage resulting from the actions of law enforcement officers acting in 
recovery for damages was only available under state tort law) with Wegner v. 
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1992) (illustrating the 
minority position and holding that where an innocent third party's property is 
damaged by the police in the course of apprehending a suspect, such action 
constitutes a compensable taking based on the language of Missouri's 
Constitution).
4 Accordingly we do not reach Petitioners' Penn Central argument, one we would 
need decide only if we found a regulatory taking. 
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their law enforcement capacity is not a compensable taking under the South 
Carolina Constitution. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
Acting Justice Jean H. Toal, concurs.  BEATTY, J., concurring 
in result only. KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., dissenting in 
separate opinions. 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  Because I would reverse the court of appeals, I dissent.  
I join the dissenting opinion of Justice Hearn but write separately to emphasize my 
view of the very limited reach of an inverse condemnation claim where law 
enforcement destroys private property.  The majority claims it is following the 
majority rule and cites cases where law enforcement damaged private property in 
the execution of a search warrant.  I, too, agree that no compensable taking occurs 
where law enforcement is acting pursuant to a warrant or other lawful process, and 
the cases from other jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion were correctly 
decided in my judgment.  Here, however, we are presented with the rare situation 
of a wholly innocent property owner whose property was destroyed by the actions 
of law enforcement.  The fact that the police action was defensible should not be 
dispositive in defeating a constitutional takings claim.  I believe there is a 
fundamental distinction between a state's exercise of its constitutional "police 
powers" and a particular law enforcement action.  I do recognize that the 
distinction is sometimes lost, as it becomes convenient to use the term "police 
powers" in a generic sense, rather than a constitutional sense.  The exercise of 
police powers, in a constitutional sense, is understood as the government's exercise 
of legislative authority to impose laws to promote the general welfare of the 
people. Take forfeiture laws, for example.  Forfeiture laws are a clear exercise of 
the state's police powers in a constitutional sense.  A decision by law enforcement 
to destroy the property of an innocent property owner, however laudable and 
defensible the decision may be, finds no legislative authority in South Carolina and 
is thus not an exercise of constitutional police powers.  And the constitution is 
what this case is all about. The takings clause, as Justice Hearn makes clear, does 
not contain the speculative public policy concerns and fears advanced in the 
majority opinion. I would allow this admittedly distinctive and rare inverse 
condemnation claim to proceed, while acknowledging the overwhelming majority 
of law enforcement actions would not give rise to a constitutional takings claim.   
18
	
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
    
JUSTICE HEARN: I agree with the majority that the narrow question in
this case is whether the City's actions constitute a compensable taking pursuant to 
Article 1, Section 13(A) of the South Carolina Constitution.  However, I do not 
agree with the majority's analysis because in my view, it marginalizes the rights of 
property owners protected by our constitution.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
Our constitution provides: "private property shall not be taken . . . for public 
use without just compensation being first made for the property."  S.C. Const. art. 
I., § 13(A). This provision is substantially similar to the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. See Hardin v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 371 S.C. 598, 
604, 641 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2007) ("South Carolina courts have embraced federal 
takings jurisprudence as providing the rubric under which we analyze whether an 
interference with someone's property interests amounts to a constitutional 
taking.").
From its inception, the takings clause has been designed to protect the right 
of private property owners to the value—not just the existence—of their property 
from government intrusion.  See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries, *138 ("The 
individual's right of property consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all 
his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the 
land."). This principle is inherent in the Court's understanding that a taking does 
not have to be permanent to be compensable.  See Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 
S.C. 650, 657, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2005) ("[W]e remove the element 'some degree 
of permanence' [from the requirements for an inverse condemnation claim], for it 
conflicts with the principle that the government must compensate for even a 
temporary taking."). 
Here, we consider the question of whether an inverse condemnation claim 
arises where private property is destroyed by the government during the course of 
an emergency. I believe this question has a simple answer.  The police damaged 
the convenience store so significantly as to "take" the property from its owners, 
and this taking clearly served the public use of apprehending a dangerous suspect.  
Regardless of who is assigned fault for this act, faithful interpretation of our 
constitution demands compensation for the innocent individual.5 
5 I would not extend this rule to situations where the claimant is complicit in the
damage to his property, such as where police executing a valid search warrant have 
to break the door down to gain entry. 
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The majority would answer this question in the negative because it 
concludes no taking occurs where property is damaged by law enforcement 
officers in the performance of their duties.  However, this position conflicts with 
the well-founded principle that a taking occurs wherever damage to property 
deprives its owner of the normal use and enjoyment.  See S.C. State Highway Dep't 
v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 366–67, 175 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1970) ("We have 
consistently held that the deprivation of the ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment 
of one's property is equivalent to the taking of it . . . . [T]here is no distinction 
between taking and damaging."). Further, the fact the damage was done here by 
law enforcement in an emergency situation is of no moment; takings clause 
jurisprudence has never turned on whether the government's actions were justified.  
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cty., 482 U.S. 
304, 315 (1987) ("This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it 
is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.").   
In my view, the majority is driven by an underlying policy concern—law 
enforcement officers risk their lives to protect the citizens and communities they 
serve, and allowing for compensation will somehow discourage them from taking 
emergency and potentially life-saving measures.  While I recognize law 
enforcement officers should be applauded for the acts they undertake in the interest 
of public safety, it should not be at the expense of the constitutional right of an 
innocent property owner to be justly compensated when property is taken for a 
public use. Private property is taken by the government for a number of beneficial 
purposes—hospitals, school, and roads to name a few.  Until today, our takings 
clause jurisprudence has never been shaped by the concern that government will 
not undertake such improvements for fear it will require compensation. 
The takings clause exists to protect the right of private property and ensures 
that no single innocent property owner shoulders the entire burden of government 
action which serves us all. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) 
("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole."). 
I would therefore allow this inverse condemnation claim by the owners 
whose property was destroyed by the government during the course of an 
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emergency to proceed. Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals' decision 
and remand to the trial court for a hearing on the merits.
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Associates, Inc.; Faultless Hardware, individually and 
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Howard A. Van Dine, III, Allen Mattison Bogan, Erik 
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Appellants. 
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Respondents. 
WILLIAMS, J.:  This matter comes before this court after the circuit court denied 
the Dinerstein Defendants' and OCIP Defendants'1 (collectively "Developer") 
1 The developers for the Gates condominium community include the following 
companies: DDC Construction, Inc.; DMC Consolidated, Inc.; DMC Builders, Co., 
Inc.; DC Developers – Columbia Condos, Inc.; Columbia Condos, LP; DMC 
Developers I, Ltd.; and Highway One Construction, Inc.  According to 
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motion for a nonjury trial and to strike the class action allegations of Katharine 
Swinson, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the Gates 
at Williams-Brice Condominium Association (collectively "Homeowners").  On 
appeal, Developer contends the circuit court erred in failing to enforce the written 
jury trial and class action waivers in the master deed (Master Deed) for the Gates at 
Williams-Brice (the Gates).  We reverse. 
I. FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
At issue in this appeal is whether Homeowners are entitled to proceed as a class in 
a jury trial against Developer for alleged faulty workmanship that occurred during 
the construction of 158 condominium units at the Gates in Columbia, South 
Carolina, in mid-2006.  According to Homeowners, the Gates' Property Owners 
Association (POA) was first notified of construction defects in the condominiums 
in November 2012 when a maintenance company, Watertight Systems, Inc., 
refused to bid on an exterior caulking/sealant job due to perceived construction 
issues. Approximately one month after this discovery, Homeowners filed their 
initial complaint on December 26, 2012, against DDC Construction, Inc. (DDC) 
and others, raising negligence, gross negligence, breach of warranty, and strict 
liability claims.   
Homeowners, these companies operated under the trade name "Dinerstein 
Companies."  Although these defendants object to this designation, the court 
references these parties in their developer capacity as "Dinerstein Defendants."  
The subcontractors covered under the Dinerstein Defendants' owner-controlled 
insurance policy (OCIP Defendants) include the following: Associated Concrete 
Contractors, Inc.; Bailey Electric Company, LLC; C&B Utilities, LP; Carolina 
Floor Systems, Inc.; Century Fire Protection, LLC; Cherokee, Inc.; Coronado 
Stucco, LP; Cross Plains Custom Tile, Inc.; Lowry Construction & Framing, Inc.; 
LTB Construction, Inc.; Martin Morales, Jr. Painting & Drywall, LLC; Metal 
Construction Materials, Inc.; and Wyman Acoustics LLC.  Several of these 
developers and subcontractors settled with Homeowners prior to the filing and 
during the pendency of this appeal.  The remaining defendants on appeal are DDC 
Construction, Inc. and Columbia Condos, LP.  For ease of reference, the court 
collectively references the nonsettling parties throughout this appeal as 
"Developer." 
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DDC—the only appellant that was a party to the initial complaint—filed its answer 
on March 7, 2013. In its answer, DDC "specifically denie[d] any class is proper" 
and "oppose[d] the certification of a class in this matter."  Although DDC did not 
specifically oppose Homeowners' right to a jury trial, DDC "denie[d] that 
[Homeowners were] entitled to any of the relief sought in the WHEREFORE 
clause."2  DDC generally asserted that "[Homeowners'] claims against it may be 
barred by the defenses of laches, mistake, release, waiver, ratification, estoppel, 
unclean hands, statute of limitations and/or any other defense that may be available 
upon discovery of additional information during the pendency of this action." 
(emphasis added).  Without specifically referencing the Master Deed, DDC 
"reserve[d] its right to amend this Answer to assert further allegations in support of 
any such defenses as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure."
On May 15, 2013, Homeowners filed an amended complaint to add other 
developers as well as certain subcontractors who provided materials or performed 
work at the Gates, asserting the same causes of action. Shortly after filing the 
amended complaint, Homeowners amended the Master Deed (Second 
Amendment)3 on May 23, 2013, to remove certain provisions—originally included 
by Developer—that purported to limit the POA and Homeowners' rights.  
Homeowners removed the warranty provision that eliminated their right to recoup 
"any and all secondary, incidental or consequential damages caused by any defect 
or breach . . . ."  In addition to the warranty disclaimer, Homeowners voted to 
remove the provision from section IV in the Master Deed, titled "ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT," which stated as follows: 
EACH AND EVERY CLAIM AND CAUSE OF 
ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED IN 
ANY WAY TO THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, 
2 Homeowners' complaint caption included a "(Jury Trial Demanded)" notation.  
Homeowners' request for a jury trial was located in the "WHEREFORE" clause.  
("WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury and pray actual and 
consequential damages . . . ."). 
3 Developer maintained control of the Gates' Horizontal Property Regime (the 
Regime) and the POA from the condominiums' completion in July 2007 until 
Developer amended the Master Deed in December 2009 (First Amendment) to 
relinquish control of the POA to Homeowners.  
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SALE, MAINTENANCE, HABITABILITY OF, OR 
CONDITION OF ANY UNIT OR COMMON AREA 
THAT IS ASSERTED BY (I) ANY PERSON OR 
ENTITY THAT NOW HAS OR HEREAFTER 
ACQUIRES ANY INTEREST IN A UNIT, (II) THE 
GRANTOR OR DEVELOPER, (III) THE UNIT 
OWNER'S ASSOCIATION (INCLUDING ANY 
CORPORATION OR OTHER ENTITY FORMED 
TO SERVE AS UNIT OWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION, . . . OR (V) ANY HEIR, 
SUCCESSOR, DELEGATEE OR ASSIGNEE OF 
ANY SUCH PERSON OR ENTITIES, SHALL BE 
RESOLVED BY FINAL AND BINDING 
ARBITRATION . . . . 
Homeowners also voted to remove Section XXXV in the Master Deed, titled 
"Alternative Dispute Resolution." Specifically, the amendment removed 
subsection D, titled "Waiver of Jury Trial," which was located on the last two 
pages of the deed and stated as follows: 
BY ACCEPTANCE OF A DEED TO ANY UNIT OR 
OTHER PROPERTY HEREUNDER CO-
OWNER(S) HEREBY KNOWINGLY, 
VOLUNTARILY AND INTENTIONALLY HEREBY 
AGREE, THAT: 
(i) NEITHER CO-OWNER NOR ANY ASSIGNEE, 
SUCCESSOR, HEIR, OR LEGAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF CO-OWNER OR 
GRANTOR, SHALL SEEK A JURY TRIAL IN ANY 
LAWSUIT, PROCEEDING, OR ANY OTHER 
LITIGATION PROCEDURE ARISING FROM OR 
BASED UPON THE MATTERS SET FORTH 
HEREUNDER, OR TO THE DEALINGS OR 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OR AMONG THE 
GRANTOR, ITS AGENTS, CONTRACTORS, 
SUBCONTRACTORS, ARCHITECTS, 
ENGINEERS AND THE CO-OWNERS OR THE 
ASSOCIATION, INCLUDING WITHOUT 
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LIMITATION WAIVER OF ANY TYPE OF CLASS 
ACTION SUIT; 
(ii) NEITHER CO-OWNER NOR GRANTOR WILL 
SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE ANY SUCH ACTION IN 
WHICH A JURY TRIAL HAS BEEN WAIVED 
WITH ANY OTHER ACTION IN WHICH A JURY 
TRIAL HAS NOT BEEN OR CANNOT BE 
WAIVED; 
(iii) NEITHER OWNER NOR GRANTOR HAS IN 
ANY WAY AGREED WITH OR REPRESENTED 
TO ANY OTHER PARTY THAT THE 
PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION WILL NOT BE 
FULLY ENFORCED IN ALL INSTANCES; AND 
(iv) THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS 
ARTICLE ARE A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT 
FOR GRANTOR TO MAKE THE 
DECLARATIONS SET FORTH HEREIN. 
Homeowners recorded the amended Master Deed on June 5, 2013.   
On July 5, 2013, DDC filed an answer to Homeowners' amended complaint, 
raising the same defenses as well as stating that "[Homeowners'] claims should be 
dismissed because of disclaimers and other defenses specifically provided in the 
Master Deed." One month later, on August 5, 2013, DDC filed an amended 
answer to Homeowners' amended complaint, again raising the same defenses as 
well as asserting new defenses pursuant to the South Carolina Notice and 
Opportunity to Cure Construction Dwelling Defects Act.4  On August 5 and 15, 
2013, the newly added developers and subcontractors filed answers to 
Homeowners' amended complaint in which they also raised the same defenses.5    
4 S.C. Code. Ann. §§ 40-59-810 through -860 (2011).   
5 On August 8, 2013, former defendant Kapasi Glass Mart, Inc. filed a motion to 
dismiss Homeowners' class action claims, which the circuit court denied. Kapasi 
subsequently settled with Homeowners.  
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Homeowners filed their second amended complaint on February 19, 2014, naming 
the last defendant, Highway One Construction, and reasserting the same causes of 
action as previously pled. In Highway One Construction's initial answer filed on 
March 21, 2014, it specifically stated Homeowners waived their right to a jury trial 
and class action. The same day Highway One Construction filed its answer, the 
remaining defendants responded to the second amended complaint and specifically 
included language asserting Homeowners had waived their right to a jury trial and 
their right to bring a class action.  Three days later, on March 24, 2014, Developer 
filed its motion for a nonjury trial and to strike Homeowners' class action 
allegations and jury trial demand. 
The circuit court held a hearing on Developer's motion on June 9, 2014.  At the 
hearing, counsel for Developer acknowledged Homeowners' position regarding the 
Second Amendment, stating, "[T]he opposition spent some time talking about 
whether we have the right to challenge the [Second Amendment] or not.  At this 
point[,] we're not challenging the amendment as it might apply prospectively to 
other people. We're simply challenging it as it applies to our client."  After hearing 
arguments from both parties, the circuit court subsequently issued an order, dated 
July 18, 2014, in which it denied Developer's motion.  In so doing, the court held 
Developer (1) failed to challenge the mode of trial at the first opportunity prior to
submitting an answer; (2) improperly sought enforcement of the class action and 
jury trial waivers that were no longer provisions within the Master Deed; (3) failed 
to timely challenge the Second Amendment to the Master Deed; (4) could not 
challenge Homeowners' right to amend the Master Deed; (5) waived enforcement 
of the Master Deed's arbitration provisions, which included the waivers for a jury 
trial and class action, by failing to timely request arbitration; and (6) was precluded 
from enforcing "unconscionable arbitration and alternative dispute resolution 
provisions" that contained "oppressive, one-sided terms."  
Developer filed a motion to alter or amend the court's findings.  The circuit court 
denied Developer's motion, finding it neither overlooked nor disregarded any 
material fact or principle of law and additionally supported its decision by finding 
Developer failed to provide a copy of its motion to alter or amend to the court 
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within ten days of the filing of the motion as prescribed by Rule 59(g), SCRCP.6 
This appeal followed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW7 
"Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law."  Verenes v. 
Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 15, 690 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2010).  Further, "the granting or 
refusal of a [m]otion to [s]trike . . . will not be reversed except for an abuse of 
discretion or unless the action of the [circuit court] was controlled by an error of 
law." Brown v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 190, 194–95, 213 S.E.2d 
726, 728 (1975). Appellate courts may decide questions of law with no particular 
deference to the circuit court's findings.  Verenes, 387 S.C. at 15, 690 S.E.2d at 
772–73. 
6 Rule 59(g), SCRCP, states, "A party filing a written motion under this rule shall 
provide a copy of the motion to the judge within ten (10) days after the filing of the 
motion." 
7 The parties disagree on the appropriate standard of review for this appeal.  
Homeowners state this court must apply two separate standards of review based 
upon "the nature of the rulings included in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt's denial of 
[Developer's] motion."  First, Homeowners assert the determination of the 
arbitrability of their claims is subject to de novo review.  Second, Homeowners 
assert the circuit court's rulings regarding mode of trial and Developer's motion to 
strike are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.  While Developer 
did not include a standard of review in its initial brief, Developer argues in its reply 
brief that the appropriate scope of review for the entire appeal is de novo because 
the jury trial and class action issues are questions of law.  We are aware the circuit 
court raised the unconscionability of the arbitration provision as an additional 
sustaining ground in its order; however, the court specifically noted "[Developer's]
motion is not one to compel arbitration."  Reviewing the order and the underlying 
purpose of Developer's motion, we find the issues before this court are the 
enforcement of a jury trial waiver and a class action waiver, which we find to be 
questions of law subject to de novo review.
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III. LAW/ANALYSIS 
Developer contends the circuit court erred in failing to enforce the jury trial and 
class action waivers in the Master Deed when the court denied its motion for a 
nonjury trial and its motion to strike Homeowners' class action allegations.  
Developer raises the following arguments in support of its position: (1) its motion 
was timely; (2) the Master Deed could not be amended retroactively to remove the 
waivers at issue; (3) the waivers are enforceable under South Carolina law; and (4) 
Developer's election not to arbitrate did not waive its right to seek a nonjury trial.  
We address each argument in turn. 
A. Timeliness 
As an initial matter, we address Developer's timeliness argument because 
Homeowners contend Developer's failure to timely file its motion is a procedural 
bar to reviewing Developer's appeal.  We find Developer's motion was timely. 
The circuit court denied Developer's motion based in part upon its conclusion that 
Developer failed to timely raise the jury trial and class action issues "at the first 
opportunity" as required by Foggie v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 315 S.C. 17, 431 
S.E.2d 587 (1993). Although we do not disagree with the requirement to timely 
raise these issues, we find the circuit court misconstrued the "first opportunity" 
requirement as set forth in Foggie. 
In Foggie, CSX Transportation argued—among other issues—that an award of
damages under a certain statute was within the equity jurisdiction of the court and 
not proper for jury consideration absent a waiver of jurisdiction.  Id. at 23, 431 
S.E.2d at 590. Our supreme court found the issue of improper jurisdiction was 
raised for the first time on appeal and determined the issue was more properly 
framed as a question of the mode of trial.  Id.  In so finding, the supreme court 
stated that "[i]ssues regarding mode of trial must be raised in the trial court at the 
first opportunity, and the order of the trial judge is immediately appealable."  Id. 
Because CSX never raised this issue to the circuit court, the supreme court held the 
issue could not be raised on appeal. Id. 
Subsequent cases have expounded on the supreme court's holding in Foggie as it 
relates to the first opportunity requirement.  In Lester v. Dawson, our supreme 
court held a client's failure to timely appeal an order designating his case as 
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nonjury in an attorney's fees collection matter barred his appeal.  327 S.C. 263, 
266, 491 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1997). Prior to trial, the client moved for a jury trial on 
two separate occasions, and the circuit court denied the client's motions, resulting 
in the case being placed on the nonjury roster.  Id. at 265, 491 S.E.2d at 241.  The 
client did not appeal the circuit court's ruling at that time, but he renewed his 
motion during the bench trial, which the court denied, and again, after the trial in 
the client's motion for reconsideration.  Id.  Citing to Foggie, our supreme court 
stated that orders affecting the mode of trial affect substantial rights under our 
appellate jurisdiction statute and, therefore, must be appealed immediately.  Id. at 
266, 491 S.E.2d at 241. The client's failure to do so precluded the supreme court's 
review of the issue on appeal.  Id. 
Later, in Frampton v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, this court 
addressed whether the department of transportation waived its right to appeal the 
circuit court's denial of the department's motion to transfer the case to the nonjury 
docket by not immediately appealing the circuit court's initial order denying the 
department's motion.  406 S.C. 377, 385–86, 752 S.E.2d 269, 274 (Ct. App. 2013).  
Citing again to Foggie, the court concluded the department failed to preserve the 
issue for appeal because it did not immediately appeal the circuit court's order 
affecting the mode of trial, which the court reiterated was a substantial right.  Id. at 
386, 752 S.E.2d at 274. 
Our reading of Foggie and the foregoing cases leads this court to the inescapable 
conclusion that the first opportunity requirement deals with preserving a mode of 
trial issue for appellate consideration, rather than raising the issue prior to a 
responsive pleading for it to be properly considered by the circuit court.  As a 
result, we find Developer raised the issues regarding mode of trial at the first 
opportunity—as required under Foggie—when Developer timely appealed the 
circuit court's order denying its request for a nonjury trial.  We believe this was the 
purpose behind the first opportunity requirements espoused in Foggie. See Shah v. 
Richland Mem. Hosp., 350 S.C. 139, 152, 564 S.E.2d 681, 688 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(reiterating that orders concerning the mode of trial affect substantial rights and 
holding that when a party fails to immediately appeal an order designating a case 
as a nonjury matter, it acts as a waiver of the right to appeal that issue). 
We also note that pleadings are to be liberally construed, and the purpose of raising 
mode of trial issues at the earliest opportunity is to place the opposing party on 
notice of the issues at stake in the case.  See Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of 
Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573–74, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("Pleadings are to be 
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liberally construed 'to do substantial justice to all parties.'  It is elementary that the 
principal purpose of pleadings is to inform the pleader's adversary of legal and 
factual positions which he will be required to meet on trial." (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Quality Towing, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 29, 33, 
530 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2000); S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Joyner, 289 S.C. 382, 387, 346 
S.E.2d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 1986))); see also Langston v. Niles, 265 S.C. 445, 455, 
219 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1975) ("The purpose of pleadings is to place the adversary on 
notice as to what the issues are.").  In this instance, we conclude that Homeowners 
were on notice of Developer's position because Homeowners attempted to amend 
the Master Deed to remove the jury trial and class action provisions only after
receiving DDC Construction's answer to the initial complaint.  
In addition, DDC Construction—the first defendant to answer Homeowners' 
complaint—generally denied the class action allegations8 and the jury trial 
demand9 in its initial answer. DDC also reserved the right to supplement its 
pleadings with additional defenses at that time.  Further, in its answer to 
Homeowners' amended complaint, DDC asserted that "[Homeowners'] claims 
should be dismissed because of disclaimers and other defenses specifically 
provided in the Master Deed."   
We recognize this was not a case in which only one responsive pleading was 
required. Rather, Homeowners added numerous defendants over the course of 
almost twenty months.  Whereas the first defendant, DDC Construction, generally 
denied Homeowners' rights to a jury trial and class action, the last defendant added 
by Homeowners, Highway One Construction, specifically denied the class action 
allegations and Homeowners' jury trial demand in its initial answer.10  Highway 
8 In its answer, DDC "specifically denie[d] any class is proper" and "oppose[d] the 
certification of a class in this matter." 
9 DDC "denie[d] that [Homeowners were] entitled to any of the relief sought in the
WHEREFORE clause." Homeowners' "WHEREFORE" clause stated as follows: 
"WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury and pray actual and 
consequential damages . . . ." 
10 As to the class action allegations, Highway One Construction asserted, 
"Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraphs 71 through 80 as they relate to it 
and opposes the certification of a class in this matter.  Answering further, 
Defendant states that Plaintiffs and all putative class members have waived their 
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One Construction filed its answer less than one month after it was added as a 
defendant, which we find clearly to be timely.  Under these circumstances, we 
believe that a liberal construction of the defendants' answers—both individually 
and collectively—results in "substantial justice to all parties," and their answers 
and amended answers sufficiently placed Homeowners on notice that they opposed 
Homeowners' right to proceed as a class in a jury trial.  See Shirley's Iron Works, 
403 S.C. at 573–74, 743 S.E.2d at 785. 
We also disagree with Homeowners' contention that Developer failed to 
appropriately raise the mode of trial issues at the "first opportunity" as required by 
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  Homeowners note that Developer 
moved—in part—pursuant to Rule 12(f), SCRCP.  According to Rule 12(f), 
SCRCP, a party must submit a motion to strike before responding to a pleading or 
within thirty days following the service of a pleading if no response is required.
However, Developer also supported its motion pursuant to Rules 23(d)(1),11 38, 
and 39, SCRCP. Considering the relief sought and the nature of the court's rulings, 
we find Rules 38 and 39, SCRCP, to be controlling regarding timeliness.  Under 
Rule 39(a), SCRCP, if a party requests a jury trial pursuant to Rule 38, "[t]he trial 
of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless . . . (2) the court upon motion or 
its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues 
right to proceed as a class in this matter."  As to the jury trial request, Highway 
One Construction stated, "Plaintiffs have waived their right to a jury trial.  
Plaintiffs and all putative class members have waived their right to proceed [with] 
the class action mode of trial." 
11 Rule 23(d)(1), SCRCP, states,  
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the 
court may make appropriate orders: (1) As soon as 
practicable, after the commencement of an action brought 
as a class action, the court shall determine by order 
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this 
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits.  
Neither party argues Rule 23 controls the timing of this motion.   
33
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
does not exist." Nowhere in the plain language of Rule 39(a) is a party required to 
move for a nonjury trial prior to a responsive pleading.  Furthermore, when read in 
conjunction with Rule 38, SCRCP, we find it would be inconsistent to permit a 
party to move for a jury trial as late as ten days after the service of the last 
pleading, yet require a party to move for a nonjury trial prior to the first responsive 
pleading. See Rule, 38(b), SCRCP ("Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor 
in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 
days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.").  Based upon all 
of the foregoing and when liberally construing the pleadings in favor of Developer, 
we find Developer asserted these issues in a timely manner. See Pittman v. 
Galloway, 281 S.C. 70, 73, 313 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ct. App. 1984) ("It is 
fundamental that pleadings must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader.").   
B. Amendment of Master Deed 
Developer next contends the circuit court erred in holding Homeowners properly 
amended the Master Deed to remove the jury trial and class action waiver 
provisions. Developer also claims that, contrary to the circuit court's finding, it 
timely challenged the Second Amendment to the Master Deed.  We agree. 
Because Homeowners claim Developer's failure to object to the amendment prior 
to the circuit court's order precludes review of this issue on appeal, we first address 
the timeliness of the challenge to the Second Amendment.  In its order denying 
Developer's motion to strike, the circuit court held the following: 
The Master Deed, via its Second Amendment, contains 
neither of these alleged waivers, and Defendants do not 
challenge the Second Amendment's validity.  
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is procedurally 
precluded – Defendants failed to challenge the validity of 
the Second Amendment deleting the alleged waivers 
from the Master Deed, and thus, Defendants cannot 
maintain an argument as to the effectiveness of such 
waivers. 
Reviewing the record, we conclude the court's finding on this issue is incorrect and 
unsupported by the evidence.  First, counsel for Developer expressly raised this 
issue at the motion to strike hearing.  Counsel acknowledged Homeowners' 
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position regarding the Second Amendment, stating, "[T]he opposition spent some 
time talking about whether we have the right to challenge the [Second 
Amendment] or not. At this point[,] we're not challenging the amendment as it 
might apply prospectively to other people.  We're simply challenging it as it 
applies to our client." Further, Developer's proposed order granting the motion to 
strike, submitted to the circuit court upon request and included in the record on 
appeal, specifically addressed the validity of the Second Amendment.  Therefore, 
we find Developer clearly raised this argument to the circuit court.  Having found 
this issue was properly raised, we next address whether the circuit court erred in 
concluding Homeowners' Second Amendment to the Master Deed applied to 
Developer. 
Homeowners amended the Master Deed to remove these waivers more than six 
months after filing their initial complaint and just over one week after filing their 
first amended complaint. Neither party contests that Homeowners' actions were 
taken in anticipation of litigation.  As discussed in Part IV.C., infra, we find 
Homeowners knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived their rights to a jury 
trial and to a class action when they signed the deeds to their condominiums.  To 
that end, we disagree with the circuit court's conclusion that Homeowners' 
amendments could apply retroactively to remove these otherwise agreed-upon 
waivers because these amendments would effectively be "substituting a new 
obligation for the original bargain of the covenanting parties."  See generally 
Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 633 S.E.2d 78, 87 (N.C. 2006) 
(citing to several other jurisdictions that employ a reasonableness standard when 
reviewing amendments to covenants and holding "a provision authorizing a 
homeowners' association to amend a declaration of covenants does not permit 
amendments of unlimited scope; rather, every amendment must be reasonable in 
light of the contracting parties' original intent").   
The circuit court cites several cases dealing with amendments to declarations of 
covenants for the proposition that an amendment to a master deed can apply 
retroactively to restrict the rights of a developer.  We find these cases are not 
controlling as to the resolution of this issue and, therefore, find the circuit court 
improperly relied upon them in rendering its decision.  See Queens Grant II 
Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 368 S.C. 342, 368–69, 628 
S.E.2d 902, 915, 917 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding developer's amendment to a 
declaration of covenants to increase maintenance assessments was enforceable 
against new purchasers of condominium units where new owners had notice of 
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covenants and there was no claim new covenants were indefinite, contravened 
public policy, or were unreasonable); Apple II Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Tr. 
Co., 659 N.E.2d 93, 99 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (approving amendment in a 
condominium unit's declaration of covenants regarding a leasing restriction and 
finding amendment applied to current owners of condominiums); Crest Builders, 
Inc. v. Willow Falls Improvement Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) 
(finding temporary injunction was improperly granted to a developer and 
homeowners' association validly amended its declaration of covenants to prohibit 
the developer from advertising on the property); Frantz v. Piccadilly Place Condo. 
Ass'n, 597 S.E.2d 354, 356–57 (Ga. 2004) (holding statute and amended 
declaration authorizing condominium association to suspend utilities for unpaid 
judgments was properly applied against a unit owner and explaining any "alleged 
retroactivity" of the amendment was proper based upon the contractual relationship 
between the association and the unit owner).  
Regarding the remainder of the cases cited by the circuit court, we find those cases
readily distinguishable because they neither deal with amendments to 
condominium declarations nor to master deeds.  See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. 
Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the validity of a 
contractual provision between a transportation provider and the national park 
service and allowing for the readjustment of franchise fees without modifying the 
contract); Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F. Supp. 954, 956 
(D.S.C. 1979) (determining that South Carolina's Regulation of Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Dealers Act did not apply retroactively to a particular dealership 
contract); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41–42, 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) 
(construing a deed as a whole by ascertaining grantor's intent when the granting 
clause indicated the conveyance of a life estate of the property but the habendum
clause indicated conveyance in fee simple).12  Furthermore, we are unaware of any 
12 Developer also contends Homeowners' amendments to the Master Deed were
ineffective because Homeowners failed to obtain the required permission of 
mortgage holders and other "bound parties" such as Developer.  We decline to 
address these issues based on our conclusion, infra, that Homeowners voluntarily 
and knowingly waived their rights to a jury trial and rights to proceed as a class 
when they signed the deeds to their condominium units.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(noting an appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues when its 
determination of a prior issue is dispositive). 
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authority in this state that would permit contracting parties, such as Developer and 
Homeowners, to unilaterally alter agreed upon provisions once litigation has 
commenced.  We conclude that permitting an amendment to a master deed to 
nullify prior actions when those actions eventually become unfavorable to one of 
the contracting parties is against the weight of authority.  See Ellis v. Taylor, 316 
S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) ("The court's duty is to enforce the 
contract made by the parties regardless of its wisdom or folly, apparent 
unreasonableness, or the parties' failure to guard their rights carefully.").  
Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred in finding Homeowners could 
retroactively amend the Master Deed once litigation commenced between the 
parties. 
C. Enforceability of Waivers  
Developer claims the waivers are enforceable, and the circuit court erroneously 
concluded Homeowners did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights to a 
jury trial and to proceed as a class.  We agree. 
"A party may waive the right to a jury trial by contract."  Beach Co. v. Twillman, 
Ltd., 351 S.C. 56, 63, 566 S.E.2d 863, 866 (Ct. App. 2002).  However, although 
the right to a trial by jury is a substantial right, and we "strictly construe" such 
waivers, id. at 64, 566 S.E.2d at 866, "[a] person who signs a contract or other 
written document cannot avoid the effect of the document by claiming that he did 
not read it." Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 663, 582 S.E.2d 432, 440 
(Ct. App. 2003). Instead, when a person signs a document, he is responsible for 
exercising reasonable care to protect himself by reading the document and making 
sure of its contents. Id. at 663–64, 582 S.E.2d at 440.   
The circuit court found Homeowners should not be bound by the waivers in the 
Master Deed because the POA was controlled by Developer at its creation and, 
thus, Homeowners had no way to voluntarily relinquish their rights.  We disagree. 
The terms of the Master Deed were expressly incorporated into each unit owner's 
purchase contract. By signing the purchase contract at closing, each homeowner 
was charged with having read the Master Deed's contents.  Further, the Master 
Deed was also incorporated into the bylaws of the POA, which were available to 
all unit owners prior to purchasing their units.  We note that each unit owner was 
also represented by counsel at his or her real estate closing so that any questions 
regarding the meaning or applicability of these waivers could have been addressed 
prior to closing. Even if Homeowners were unaware of the inclusion of these 
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waiver provisions, we find they cannot avoid the effects of the waivers merely by 
arguing they were unaware that such provisions were included in the deed.  See 
Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 333, 755 S.E.2d 437, 443 (2014) 
(finding mortgagees' failure to be aware of a jury trial waiver clause in their note 
and guaranty did not preclude the waiver from being enforceable when mortgagees 
signed the note and guaranty).
Further, we find the waiver provisions were conspicuous and unambiguous.  In this 
case, the jury trial waiver comprised the last two pages of the deed and was 
expressly captioned as "Waiver of Jury Trial." In addition, the substance of the 
waiver is printed in all bold capital letters on the last page of the Master Deed.  The
language waiving Homeowners' rights to a jury trial and to proceed as a class was 
also unambiguous: 
(i) NEITHER CO-OWNER NOR ANY 
ASSIGNEE . . . SHALL SEEK A JURY TRIAL IN 
ANY LAWSUIT . . . ARISING FROM OR BASED 
UPON THE MATTERS SET FORTH 
HEREUNDER, OR TO THE DEALINGS OR 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OR AMONG THE 
GRANTOR, ITS AGENTS, . . . AND THE CO-
OWNERS OR THE ASSOCIATION, INCLUDING 
WITHOUT LIMITATION WAIVER OF ANY TYPE 
OF CLASS ACTION SUIT[.] 
We disagree with the circuit court's conclusion that the waivers were 
unconscionable because the waivers attempted to disclaim Developer's liability and 
unconscionably restricted Homeowner's right to bring suit. A review of the waiver 
reveals no language containing any limitation on liability or the right to bring a 
legal action. Rather, the waiver mutually waives Homeowners and Developer's 
rights to a jury trial and class action lawsuit.  Without a showing that the waiver is 
oppressive and contains one-sided terms, we disagree with the circuit court's ruling 
on this issue. See Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 
402, 472 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1996) (stating unconscionability is the "absence of 
meaningful choice on part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, 
together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make 
them and no fair and honest person would accept them"); cf. Simpson v. MSA of 
Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 34, 644 S.E.2d 663, 673–74 (2007) (finding an 
arbitration clause in a vehicle trade-in contract between an automobile dealership 
38
	
 
 
 
  
 
 
and its customer was unconscionable and unenforceable because the customer 
lacked business judgment, had no attorney to assist her, was "hastily" presented 
with the contract by the dealer for her signature, and the arbitration clause's
limitation on remedies was oppressive and one-sided). Because we find 
Homeowners knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights, and these rights were 
conspicuously and unambiguously set forth in the Master Deed, we reverse the 
circuit court and find the waivers are enforceable.  See Blackburn, 407 S.C. at 333 
n.8, 755 S.E.2d at 443 n.8 (finding jury trial waivers were conspicuous and 
unambiguous when waivers were printed in all capital letters, had a bold heading 
titled "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL," and were located at the end of a six-page 
document). 
D. Election Not to Arbitrate 
Last, Developer contends the circuit court committed reversible error when it 
concluded that Developer waived its right to a nonjury trial and to proceed without 
a class because Developer elected not to arbitrate.  We agree. 
The circuit court cites to numerous actions taken by Developer in support of its 
conclusion that Developer waived its right to arbitrate—and, therefore, its rights to 
a nonjury trial and to proceed without a class—including the following: (1) 
participating in numerous depositions, (2) taking homeowner and board member 
depositions, (3) filing cross-claims against other defendants, (4) filing motions, and 
(5) otherwise actively litigating this case.  Regardless of these actions, we find that 
Developer's decision to request a bench trial is wholly unrelated to its decision not 
to arbitrate. Although the arbitration and jury trial waiver provisions are located 
within the section of the Master Deed titled, "Alternative Dispute Resolution," the 
jury trial and class action waivers in subsection D are completely separate and 
distinct from the arbitration provision found in subsection B. Based upon our 
review of the Master Deed, we find Developer's inclusion of both of these 
subsections within the overarching alternative dispute resolution section was 
intended to afford the option to either arbitrate or seek a nonjury trial.   
Further, language in the "Waiver of Jury Trial" subsection supports this 
conclusion. Specifically, we find the Master Deed contemplated litigation outside 
of the arbitration context by prohibiting either an owner or grantor from seeking a 
jury trial in "any lawsuit, proceeding, or any other litigation procedure."  
Construing the jury trial waiver and the arbitration provisions as mutually 
exclusive renders the jury trial waiver superfluous because all arbitration 
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proceedings are without a jury.  See Stevens Aviation, Inc. v. DynCorp Int'l LLC, 
407 S.C. 407, 417, 756 S.E.2d 148, 153 (2014) ("[A]n interpretation that gives 
meaning to all parts of the contract is preferable to one which renders provisions in 
the contract meaningless or superfluous." (quoting Crown Laundry & Dry 
Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 506, 515 (1993))).  Because we find 
Developer could logically pursue its right to a nonjury trial and to proceed without 
a class while declining to exercise its right to arbitrate, we disagree with the circuit 
court's conclusion on this issue.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court erred in denying Developer's 
motion for a nonjury trial and to strike Homeowners' class action allegations.  
Accordingly, the circuit court's decision is  
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS, J., concur. 
40
	
